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by returning the exam which he received 
. from A well before taking the re-examina-
tion, B attempted to show good faith and 
lack of intent to gain an unfair advantage. 
Without deciding all the issues pre-





by Glenn A. Jacobson 
Be it bane or godsend to the legal pro-
fession, the Supreme Court has given the 
green light to the formerly blasphemous 
practice of lawyers advertising their serv-
ices. Self-regulation by member-run pro-
fessional organizations was the traditional 
means of guaranteeing the public that 
they would receive good value for their 
money and quality work when they re-
tained a lawyer. But, the exclusive 
watchdog function of these organizations 
has now been eroded by the wave of con-
sumerism. The most recent example of 
and defense, the Court holds that the 
prosecution did not successfully meet its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that B's conduct was dishonorable. 
Any presumption of dishonorable conduct 
was erased by B's unassailed testimony 
that he did not know of the Professor's 
restrictive policy as to availability of pre-
vious exams at the time of receiving the 
copy from A. 
In conclusion, B was found not guilty of 
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code. 
Supreme· Court 
Decisions 
this trend is the case of Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977). 
In 1974, John R. Bates and Van 
a'Steen, having been members of the 
Arizona Bar for two years, opened a law 
practice in Phoenix, Arizona which they 
referred to as a "legal clinic." A major 
goal of this practice was "to provide legal 
services at modest fees to persons of 
moderate income who did not qualify for 
governmental legal aid." 97 S.Ct. at 
2694. 
The clinic accepted only routine mat-
ters such as uncontested separations and 
divorces, personal bankruptcies, name 
changes, and uncontested adoptions, 
making extensive use of paralegal assist-
ants and standardized forms to facilitate a 
quick flow of business. 
Two years later, "appellants concluded 
that their practice and clinical concept 
could not survive unless the availability of 
legal services at low cost was advertised 
and, in particular, fees were advertised." 
97 S.Ct. at 2694. an February 22, 1976, 
Bates and a'Steen placed their advertise-
ment in the Arizona Republic, a Phoenix 
daily newspaper, offering "legal services 
at very reasonable fees" and listing partic-
ular services and corresponding fees. 
In response, the President of the 
Arizona State Bar initiated proceedings 
against Bates and a'Steen, alleging that 
their advertisement was in violation of 
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona, 17 Arizona Stat. (1976 Supp.), 
p. 26. The disciplinary rule provides in 
part: 
"(B) A lawyer shall not publicize him-
self, or his partner, or associate, or any 
other lawyer through newspaper .,. 
advertisements .... " 
A three member Special Local Admin-
istrative Committee held a hearing, pur-
suant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33, 
but declined to consider an attack on the 
valildity of the rule. However, the com-
mittee did recommend that both Bates 
and a'Steen be suspended from the prac-
tice of law for at least six months. Shortly 
thereafter, the Board of Governors of the 
Arizona State Bar, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 36, reviewed the case and 
recommended one week suspensions to 
each appellant. 
Bates and a'Steen sought review of the 
case in the Arizona Supreme Court alleg-
ing that the disciplinary rule they had ig-
nored was both violative of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act and an infringement of 
their First Amendment rights. The 
Arizona Supreme Court rejected both 
claims, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States consented to hear the case. 
429 U.S. 813 (1976). 
The Supreme Court's decision in the 
Bates case focused on an analysis of the 
allegation that First Amendment Rights 
were being interfered with by the con-
tinued enforcement of Arizona Supreme 
Court Rule 20. This analysis is an exten-
sion of previous Supreme Court decisions 
acknowledging First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech. Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
In Bigelow, the managing editor of a 
Virginia newspaper was found guilty of 
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violating a state statute which prohibited 
the advertising of information which 
might " ... encourage or prompt the pro-
curing of abortion or miscarriage ... " Va. 
Code Ann. 18.1-63 (1960). The Court 
stated: 
"The central assumption made by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia was that the 
First Amendment guarantees of speech 
and press are inapplicable to paid com-
mercial advertisements. Our cases, 
however, clearly establish that speech 
is not stripped of First Amendment pro-
tection merely because it appears in 
that form." 421 U.S. at 818. 
The Supreme Court was willing to 
place commercial speech under the pro-
tection of the First Amendment because 
such communication may contain infor-
mation of potential interest and value to 
the public. 
In 1976, the case of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, ex-
panded the doctrine. Here, the Court held 
that the advertising of drug prices by state 
licensed pharmacists was permissible and 
protected by the First Amendment. The 
Court reaffirmed its earlier position: " ... 
speech does not lose its First Amendment 
protection because money is spent to pro-
ject it, as in a paid advertisment of one 
form or another." 425 U.S. at 761. 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 
an essential issue was whether an act 
prohibited by the regulating body of a 
profession could be classified under the 
doctrine of commercial free speech and ' 
consequently be afforded First Amend-
ment protection. The Court expressed its 
belief that "the advertising ban does not 
directly affect professional standards one 
way or the other". 425 U.S. at 769. 
In light of the Bigelow and Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy cases, Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona is a logical conse-
quence of the elevation of commercial 
speech to constitutionally protected com-
munication. Because the Bill of Rights 
prevailed over the commandment of a 
self-regulating professional organization, 
the public's right to be informed emerges 
as the champion in this case. The Court 
pointedly stated that they felt the Arizona 
disciplinary rule was violative of the First 
Amendment, "... the disciplinary rule 
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serves to inhibit the free flow of commer-
cial information and to keep the public in 
ignorance." 97 S.Ct. at 2700. 
It is important to note that the deci-
sions in both Pharmacy and Bates will 
relate to the advertising of prices. Only 
routine legal services lend themselves to 
advertising: the uncontested divorce, the 
simple adoption, the uncontested per-
sonal bankruptcy, and the change of 
name-the types of services advertised by 
the appellants. The Court later eliminated 
any question as to the scope of permissi-
ble advertising by indicating that adver-
tisements which are false, deceptive, or 
misleading dre subject to restraint as are 
advertised claims concerning the quality 
of the services to be performed. "In hold-
ing that advertising by attorneys may not 
be subjected to blanket suppression, and 
that the advertisement at issue is pro-
tected, we, of course do not hold that ad-
vertising by attorneys may not be regul-
ated in any way." 97 S.Ct. at 2708. 
The heart of the commercial free 
speech issue appears to be the public's 
right to information which will enable 
each consumer to make informed and 
reliable decisions. "Commercial speech 
serves to inform the public of the 
availability, nature, and prices of products 
and services, and thus performs an in-
dispensable role in the allocation of 
resources in a free enterprise system." 97 
S.Ct. at 2699. 
The Bates decision should act as a 
catalyst for the open and reliable dis-
semination of information at a time when 
the stature of many professionals, 
especially attorneys, is diminishing. A 
well informed marketplace can facilitate 
the extension of services to those who 
need them but are unsure of their 
availability. 
However, notice of the availability of 
services through price advertising does 
not eradicate the important question of 
quality and appropriateness of service. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Bates, 
while opening up many new doors, may 
also serve to add new clouds of uncertain-
ty to confuse those who were to have been 
helped. Mr. Chief Justice Berger, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, 
warned: 
"Because legal services can rarely, if 
ever be 'standardized' and because po-
tential clients rarely know in advance 
'What lire yo II tryillgto ri.fl-ruill the mllmbn-jumbn rllcket1: 
what services they do in fact need, 
price advertising can never give the 
public an accurate picture on which to 
base the selection of an attorney. In-
deed, in the context of legal services, 
such incompleted information could be 
worse than no information at all. It 
could be a trap for the unwary." 97 
S.Ct. at 2710. 
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bates will have a far reaching 
effect on the professionals's relationship 
with those who need unique services. The 
consumer has now the opportunity to 
select an attorney based on the cost of the 
services provided. Now the question must 
be whether the legal profession will sup-
port or reject the Court's belief that dis-
semination of limited information, so long 
as it is accurate, is better than continued 




by Carol A. Robertson 
On June 27, 1977 the Supreme Court 
of the United States decided the case of 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 
2691 (1977), regarding legal advertising. 
Those who thought the controversy over 
advertising in the legal profession would 
be settled by this decision were very much 
mistaken. 
On July 8, 1977 the Annapolis law firm 
of LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, 
P.A. ran ad "A" in The Evening Capital. 
This so-called advertisement merely 
announced the addition of a new associate 
to the firm. Maryland is one ()f relatively 
few jurisdictions which still prohibits such 
announcements in newspapers. Despite 
Maryland's minority stance on announce-
ment type ads the members of the firm 
felt confident that their ad would be 
above reproach. They regarded the ad as 
entirely within the Bates decision on the 
theory that permitting advertisement of 
prices of routine legal services presumes 
advertisement of existence. Confident in 
their position, the young associates inno-
cently bantered among themselves of 
possible adverse Bar Association reaction. 
Imagine their consternation when they 
received a letter from the Attorney Grie-
vance Commission of Maryland instruct-
ing them that they were believed to be in 
violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and commanding them to 
cease and desist such action or suffer un-
told consequences. The Commission did 
not choose to enlighten the attorneys as 
to exactly how they were violating the 
Code. A formal grievance was not at that 
time filed. 
Legum, Cochran & Chartrand re-
sponded that they would not discontinue 
publication of their announcement and 
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LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, P.A. 
ANNOUNCE THAT 
MARTHA WYATT 
IS NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRM 
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
ALAN HILLIARD LEGUM 
GILL COCHRAN 
GEORGEJ.CHARTRAND 
208 DUKE OF GLOUCESTER ST. 
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LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, PA 
Attorneys at Law 
208 Duke of Gloucester Street 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
263-3001 
LEGAL SERVICES AT REASONABLE FEES 
Simple Uncomplicated Will (No Trust Provisions) ............ . 
Uncontested Divorce (No Dispute Concerning Grounds for Divorce) 
Simple Separation Agreement (Without Negotiation) ......... . 
Simple Power of Attorney .............................. . 
Preparation of Real Estate Sales Contract .................. . 
Preparation of Simple Deed ............................. . 
Brankruptcy Preceedings-Individual-
Nonbusiness, Uncontested 
Proceedings ...................................... . 
Change of Name (Uncontested) .......................... . 










The fee charges in other types of cases and in contested cases will depend on and 
vary according to the individual circumstances of that case. The above fees are in 
addition to court costs as assessed by the Clerk of Court. 
Hours: Monday, Wednesday and Friday-9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
Tuesday and Thursday-9 a.m. to 7 p.m. 
Saturday-By appointment. 
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